Governance Structure

I put this in discord but it might live better here:

Some ideas about governance that have been floating in my head and I want to get out: There are two main voices that I think are important to represent:

  • The will of the HOLDERS, all people being treated equally.
  • The will of the $MOONEY, all tokens being treated equally.

It’s important to differentiate these two because what the “majority” of people want can be very different than what the “majority” of tokens want. Yet, both are important to represent.

This is why I think something like a bicameral system could be important:

"Senate"
One “house” is just: one-person-one-vote. A person could be defined by PoH. To avoid “attacks” here maybe for a person to be eligible to vote they must have some (small) amount “staked” in MoonDAO for a period - say 1 month - and their identity confirmed by MoonDAO. No matter how much money they have they have the same voice as anyone else in the DAO.

"Congress"
This “house” is proportional to the number of tokens someone has. Potentially without any limit. This is easy to do – no special “staking” or “voter confirmation” necessary.

  • Proposals that affect People will need to pass through the senate.
  • Proposals that affect $MOONEY will need to pass through the congress.
  • Proposals that affect BOTH will need to pass through both.

The Executive branch
Thse are the DAO multi-sig holders. They will basically do anything that the DAO decides, and cannot protest their decision ~unless~ if the following criteria is met: The proposal could irreversibly damage the long-term viability of the DAO to complete its goals. They have VETO power, but it is voted on by the multi-sig holders and this should be used very carefully.

Multisig holders can be voted in and out by majority rule. Each serve for a 1 year term and can be re-elected. I have more Constitution thoughts but maybe for now I’ll just leave this here because I’m curious to hear everyone’s thoughts on this.

Some other quick thoughts:

  • Optional representation by staking (also potentially assigning roles/status with staking)
  • Judiciary branch – a committee that decides on things like “removing” people from Discord, or resolving issues that require mediation by MoonDAO
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@pablo Just bringing the conversation on Discord about staking/voting over here. Do you know of existing voting tools that could accomplish something like this or would we need to develop our own? I like the idea of giving different powers to pure token based voting vs “humanity” based voting but it seems like implementing it could get complex. Below are a couple of concerns/thoughts:

  1. Build vs. buy
    Building is always more challenging and could take us away from our mission, but it gets us exactly what we want. Buying means we are subject to the design choices of whoever makes the tool. Maybe there is a middle path where we engage RaidGuild to build something for us that we could offer to the broader DAO community. I would also be curious to know what comes out of the box with platforms like Daohaus and Colony.

  2. Defining what affects MOONEY vs what affects people
    This is pretty subjective, and you could argue that there are few things that affect MOONEY that wouldn’t also affect people if we are using it for internal compensation. Someone would need to be the “decider” to decide whether it passes through both houses or only one, and which one. Maybe this is the role of a judiciary. Considering what happened with the current retroactive compensation vote (large holders who didn’t participate in the fundraise skewing the vote toward zero), having compensation or treasury decisions also go through the token-based voting could result in speculators blocking important actions such as allocations to pay people. Perhaps it depends on what we mean by “affect MOONEY.” Does allocation of funds from treasury rise to that level?

  3. Staking amount and structure
    If we move toward a system where a person needs to stake MOONEY, there are some weird dynamics that we need to think through. If staking is required for the “Senate” side and the amount is small to allow everyone to participate, large holders who are mostly trading and not actually invested in the day to day of the DAO could still cause havoc in our decision making on the Congress side simply because they perceive our decision will negatively affect token price or because they are just bad actors that want to disrupt things. I would much rather see staking implemented on the Congress side. You can vote with whatever number of tokens that you have staked for 30 days or more. This would take power away from speculators and give power to holders who believe. On some level a token holder needs to be willing to forgo playing games in the market if they want to have power over the DAO.

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Thanks for your thoughts Pablo. Agree with you that there are 2 main approaches: The will of HOLDERS & The will of $MOONEY. Both come with pros & cons.

My 2c as below.

1.The will of $MOONEY, or in other word Coin-Voting Governance. I’m definitely against this approach for whales’ manipulation reason which goes against MoonDAO’s core values - Decentralizing access to space.

2.The will of HOLDERs, or in other word Non-Coin Voting Governance. This seems aligned with our core values, however do have some drawbacks. E.g. some influencers (without domain knowledge & contribution to MoonDAO) can manipulate the voting. All people being treated equally seems fair but it does bring problem. I would go with equity rather than equality. Voting power should depends on people’s knowledge & contribution to MoonDAO as well.

That said, I would suggest to go with Non-Coin Voting with following amendments

  • Proof of humanity for $Mooney holders. Everyone who owns X $MOONEY and get verified can be eligible for voting. As long as they have X $MOONEY, their voting power are the same.

  • Proof of contribution. Voting power can be increased based on Contribution Score of that members, it can take into account of both efforts & financial contributions (during fund raising). This is just my thought not sure if we have any tool to calculate members’ contributions. @zeroindex mentioned buy vs build which can be considered here.

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One of the dangers of allowing anyone holding any amount of $MOONEY to have the same voting power is that anyone could easily recruit votes.

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Pablo proposed a scheme that differentiate the vote power, between the thought of holder and $MOONEY. Both of them are important.

al3sha said: One of the dangers of allowing anyone holding any amount of $MOONEY to have the same voting power, is that anyone could easily recruit votes.

I agree with him. Some $MOONEY holders may focus on financial return, and some holders are willing to take actions to fulfil the long-term mission of MoonDAO. There should be some standards to define a qualified voter.

As a rough example for our discuss, I list 3 rules to qualify a voter:

  1. hold 1k+ $MOONEY in last 30(or 60) days,

  2. have voted for 60%+ proposal in last 3 (or 6) month,

  3. have originally contributed and hold 1k+ $MOONEY.

He who satisfies one of the three rules would be deemed as a valid voter.

For another, I introduced a conception “committee”.

Committee has the duty to:

  1. deal with daily routine,

  2. make un-crucial decision.

  3. collect opinions of community and prepare official proposal

Committee are somehow like the executive department of a company. The members in Committee are not chosen by the amount of $MOONEY that they hold. They are chosen by community because they are willing to build MoonDAO and their capability to do so.

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@pablo
Here is my suggestion to MoonDAO governance:

Governance type a) to type e):
a) On discord
b) By Committee
c) By Vote on snapshot with majority consent (50% agree, 15%+ weighted vote)
d) By Vote on snapshot with most majority consent (70% agree, 30%+ weighted vote)
e) By DAO tools such as Coordinape (https://coordinape.com/ )
The weight of each vote is equal to the percentage of its Mooney’s mkt cap. But top weight is set to be 4%.

Member type:

  • Community member: who holds Mooney
  • Committee member: decide by Governance type a) and Governance type c). Introduce and discuss in discord, and then decide by Governance type c) vote. I think it’s better to give our two founders more weight in choosing committee members.
  • Agency member: specialized people in or out MoonDAO, carry out different projects. They are picked and hired by the committee.

Principal:

  • The most crucial decision is made by MoonDAO community.
  • Committee is responsible for most daily and non-crucial acts. Committee’s decision can be made informally after consent of 3/4 members, or vote on snapshot for committee members only, or entrust a specialized member.
  • Different specialized agencies are responsible in long-term or short-term for individual projects.

1.Management of Treasury
a) Inflow
i. Fund raising:
Seeking for donations is an at least choice when MoonDAO plan to carry out a big project or supplement the treasury. If this involves offering additional $MOONEY, it should be decided by Governance type c). If not, Governance type b) is good.
ii. Investment projects:
MoonDAO have to decide what to invest. It can be blockchain platform such as Compound and Curve. It can be startups in space exploration, also can be a business run by ourself such as BTC/ETH mining, selling space-related art NFT, operating an online souvenir store.
The decision making in investment needs professional skill and transparency to community. I think there should be several agencies entrusted by committee in or out of MoonDAO taking the responsibility, within their specialized field, to look for investment opportunities and deliver business plans to community. The community vote to decide which project to carry out by Governance type c).
If a business project permitted by community, agencies are authorized to carry out the project and supervised by committee. Agencies have to deliver seasonal financial report of their businesses. If reports of 2 to 6 consecutive seasons go bad, the agency have to explain to committee. Committee will decide whether or not to propose to community stop this business. Then the community vote to decide by Governance type c). If a business losses money for 6+ consecutive season, the committee are obliged to propose to stop it, but left it to Governance type c) vote to decide.

b) Outflow
i. Donation: the community discuss on discord, and the committee choose some of them to perform due diligence and give a report from them, left the choice to the community. It’s finally decided by Governance type c).
ii. Non-profit projects: the community members discuss what kind of short-term goal to achieve on discord. Members should give proposal draft on what to do and whether they are able to gather enough human resource to support the plan. The committee investigates on whether the community have enough budget and whether the goal is achievable. Then the committee give a report of feasible projects and left the choice to the community. It’s finally decided by Governance type c).
If a project permitted by community, the committee have to entrust a small group of members to form an agency to carry out the project. Budget and salaries for participants are granted by committee.
iii. Daily operating: decided by the committee, and report to community monthly or seasonally.
iv. Fulltime job enrollment: be interviewed and decided by the committee. Salaries for them refer to the market level.

2.Big decisions
a) Revise of constitution: It has to be fully discussed by MoonDAO community and committee. It should be decided in a very serious way. Governance type d) is good here.
b) Direction of future development: same as in Revise of constitution.

3.Sub-DAO of different region/ language/
I think discussed both in committee and community are important. The decision whether to initiate a sub-DAO can be made by a group of community members themself.
If the sub-DAO plan to hold a project which may cost many resources, they have to deliver their detailed description of the project. Either go according the process for Investment projects(1-a-ii) or that for non-profit projects(1-b-ii).

4.Incentive structure
Methods of other DAOs can be referred. Whether to and how to award the different kind of participation can be discussed in discord. I don’t know if we can build a model to estimate the outcome of different measures. We can also run a/b tests to improve the participation ratio (especially for vote).
Design incentive structure is a task demands continued efforts. Committee or entrusted agency may work on these topics. Every several weeks or months, they may bring about some change on Incentive topics, and propose to community to vote.
I’ll give some example of incentive methods.
a) Incentive to voter: a few Mooney or a special designed NFT for members who voted for 80% proposals.
b) Incentive to worker: mkt-level salary and bonus when project end or seasonally.
c) Incentive to other activity: best unofficial proposals in discord may be rewarded with special NFTs and a few Mooney or other little gifts made by community.

5.Interact with other community
a) Social interactions: Formal interactions can be decided by committee. Informal links by community members are welcomed.
b) Giving Token (or exchange with other communities): because it may involves using money or Mooney in treasury, we have to let the community to decide. I think we need do it by type c) or type d), depending on the number of token to deal with.

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As a rough example for our discuss, I list 3 rules to qualify a voter:

  1. hold 1k+ $MOONEY in last 30(or 60) days,
  2. have voted for 60%+ proposal in last 3 (or 6) month,
  3. have originally contributed and hold 1k+ $MOONEY.

This feels solid. We will need to revisit this when the value of $MOONEY grows.

For another, I introduced a conception “committee”.
Committee has the duty to:

  1. deal with daily routine,
  2. make un-crucial decision.
  3. collect opinions of community and prepare official proposal

I would add that this should include having the power to propose and distribute the budget approved for that Epoch/Season.

Amazing work here, @Bay0.eth ! Here are my recommendations and additions on this.


e) By DAO tools such as Coordinape (https://coordinape.com/ )

This isn’t mentioned again anywhere in this proposal, but do think it should be mentioned in the incentives proposal you did.

c) By Vote on snapshot with majority consent (50% agree, 15%+ weighted vote)
d) By Vote on snapshot with most majority consent (70% agree, 30%+ weighted vote)

I think what you’re saying here is that Kori & Pablo’s votes are weighted more, for choosing committee members, but not for all C & D votes in perpetuity - is that right? I recommend this provision sunset once the committee is established.

If we give weight to anyone in perpetuity for C&D (community votes) I recommend we spread this out to the committee.

  • Community member: who holds Mooney

I would extend this to anyone who is participating in the community. If you show up and maybe you just hang out and chat, don’t really do any work, it shouldn’t matter if you hold $MOONEY. You’re still part of the community.

  • Committee member: decide by Governance type a) and Governance type c). Introduce and discuss in discord, and then decide by Governance type c) vote. I think it’s better to give our two founders more weight in choosing committee members.

I wonder, if we create a Committee in this way, are we effectively creating a Board of Directors, and if so, do we need to look at having Directors and Officers insurance? What are other DAOs doing here? What is the exposure?

  • Agency member: specialized people in or out MoonDAO, carry out different projects. They are picked and hired by the committee.

In English we regularly refer to these as Subject Matter Experts or SMEs (we actually say ‘smees’)

If we are hiring or contracting people that are not considered community members, we should have legal help us determine what our obligations are as an employer. What insurance do we need to have? This starts dipping into the HR questions again. How is being an employee of a DAO different from being an employee? Or do we treat everyone like gig workers?

  • Committee is responsible for most daily and non-crucial acts. Committee’s decision can be made informally after consent of 3/4 members, or vote on snapshot for committee members only, or entrust a specialized member.

If we create a Committee we should have an entire discussion about what we believe the powers, checks and balances are for the Committee. I recommend we not wait to have it all figured out before creating the Committee, but that we agree that the Committee will regularly assess powers, checks, and balances for efficacy and fairness, until such time as it can and should be made part of the Constitution.

i. Fund raising:

We should also consider pursuing grants

3.Sub-DAO

A sub-DAO could occur for any reason, not just region or language. We could even consider having a business unit become a sub-DAO. One way this can happen is to have the sub-DAO issue its own token and that some amount of that treasury comes back to MoonDAO on a regular basis. MoonDAO could be largest holder in the subDAO, so many cool things could happen. This also allows the sub-DAO to maximize autonomy.

5.Interact with other community

We can also consider NFT swaps, which should fall under a similar jurisdiction as token swaps since our NFT hold value. Another is whitelist swaps.


I’d like to propose that we move to create the Committee - or is this an expansion of Astronauts, or is this the Cosmonaut layer? Our first order of business being to establish a draft charter for the Committee regarding Powers, Check and Balances and as @ashtrento suggested on Discord, we draft the General Orders.

Having a house and a senate and judiciaries and a lot of anti-capture is good, but I agree with @zeroindex and @luffy this is complicated, and in no small way by suggesting we could decide what is a Congress and what is a Senate vote.

I do feel good about there being a small and obvious group of us that show up every day and work and that I trust. From that small group, we could find more Astronauts, or Committee, to help drive decision making, especially as we work to establish a budget.

No objection. But I’m curious why we need 3 criteria? For me only criteria one “holding 1k Mooney in last 60 days” should be enough.

Mostly agree. Suggest small amendment as below:

  1. Discord for initial discussion & brain storming
  2. Discourse for solid proposal & feedbacks
  3. Snapshot for final approval

What do you mean by +15 weighted vote?

Token based quorum voting comes with many problems. Have a look at this article

Voting Options in DAOs. This article explores the different… | by Eric Arsenault | DAOstack | Medium

Your suggestion is quite aligned with @pablo ideas of Senate & Congress. However, you suggested one more group “Agency member” which I believe is necessary. As many tasks can be outsourced, no need to do it ourselves.

Agree. This is what we are lack of at the moment. We need a classification to show a task to belong to which category.

Do you have a figure showing our Management Treasury?

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I have not read through every aspect of this discussion, but I would like to add my preliminary thoughts:

  1. Agency Members – Contractors, or Special Matter Experts, should not have a vote in decision-making. Organizations don’t hire people to cast votes. However, they can compile information and give it to one of our members to present to the voting members. Contractors usually provide their own insurance or bonding.

  2. Whales will always deter the Mission of an Organization toward focusing purely on profit. I’d rather see Staked tokens give the perk of providing a service to the Organization, such as tie-breaking.

  3. The 3 rules to qualify for a voter – I feel this is too narrow and doesn’t take the future into account. We are building a space program, not a discord community. We should think of our members as citizens of the DAO with voting rights regardless of how much $mooney they hold or how many times they’ve voted in the past. If someone pledges to the DAO and is a certain age, they should be eligible to vote. The question then becomes how do our members’ votes weigh against whales? It will be the members who have to live with decisions, so do we want our members to become decentralized pawns of greedy whales? I’m not trying to sound harsh, so read that with some levity. Here’s what I’ve been working on for my proposal for our Charter (some called it a Constitution) regarding voters:

ARTICLE 3 - ELECTORS AND THE GOVERNING BODY

SECTION 3.01 - ELECTORS

Qualified Voting Members and Stakeholders whose rights have not been shelved for a violation of General Orders, law, or ordinance may be an Elector.

	A. Voting Members. A Voting Member is any person who is at least eighteen-years-old and is a pledged citizen of the Organization, or joined the Organization by birth, or is the Organization’s android running approved Artificial Intelligence software that has  passed monthly inspection, or has passed monthly inspections for at least three (3) months after having been compromised and repaired.

	B. Stakeholders. A Stakeholder is a person in possession of staked MOONEY.

Anyway… I’m still working on the Charter to present to whoever may be interested. I should be finished in a day or so.

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It is worth noting that we have a provision that prevents any one person/wallet from controlling more than 4% of the vote.

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Yes, they are important functions of committee, should be included.

Thanks, al3sha, I forget mentioning it. I haven’t used Coordinape before. I have to find out whether it’s good for single projects or MoonDAO as a whole.

Yes, only for choosing committee members. It’s a good idea that give committee members more weight power since they may have a clearer vision on the proposal than most of other members. But proposals that involves with the interests of committee should be exclude.

Yes, I think the Committee is very much like the Board of Directors, or Board of Executives. It seems that they have to work fulltime.
But I don’t know if there’s legal issue that the committee members are hired as a fulltime job. If it’s ok, insurance will be ok too.

you mean legal exposure? I’m not quite familiar with this issue…

I don’t know whether the idea of having a committee is ok for a DAO. I guess most DAOs don’t have such an institution (I have to do my research). However, I think it’s important for MoonDAO, because there will be much more real world(off-chain) jobs to be done that ordinary DAOs.

I think this is more or less a legal problem. I hope we treat our workers in a good and secure way if it’s possible.

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What kind of figure?
Do you mean the number of Mooney and other tokens in Vault (0xce4a1E86a5c47CD677338f53DA22A91d85cab2c9)?

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20220301-164528

have to notice, the swap pool is very small, hard to afford even a small dump.

there is no figure in your chart. Can you add the total volume of Mooney, USDC, ETH we have in treasury vault?

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(GnosisSafeProxy | Address 0xce4a1E86a5c47CD677338f53DA22A91d85cab2c9 | Etherscan)
in MoonDAO vault:
5,005,000 USDC
1,308,972,803.7 MOONEY (= 238,727USDC in uniswap)
15,493,187.5 JBX (=24,483 USDC in uniswap)
496.7 ETH (=1,500,440 USDC in uniswap)

Yes,vote weight depends on the number of $mooney the voter holds. Top weight=4% .

“50% agree, 15%+ weighted vote”, I mean that greater than 15% of total market value Mooney holders voted in this proposal and 50% or more of them agreed on one choice, makes it a “majority consent”.
15% is arguable low, it is just the lowest limit to avoid proposal abortion caused by low level participation in a uncrucial issue.

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I like this direction.

$1k MOONEY is a pretty small investment today but it could increase in value to be unobtainable for many people, but I do like your idea of introducing an alternative means of entry for people who vote in decisions with a smaller amount of $MOONEY in the congress. Maybe we peg it to a stable coin equivalent in $MOONEY? We don’t need to get too scientific, but something that would be obtainable for 99% of people on earth if they were to save money for a month is a good benchmark.

#1 and #3 seem like redundant rules though. If someone contributed at the beginning that’s basically the same as #1.

My recommendation would be 30 days is enough. The intent to have a delay is to avoid people packing the DAO with votes on a controversial decision, if there’s a delay then this prevents it.

For me, I hope we can reduce the amount of “committee” that is needed as much as possible. And definitely make them “live and die” by the will of the people – voted in if necessary, and only stay on for a pretermined time and then they must have a “vote of confidence” – say every 3 months or so.

But having a team that can move quickly on smaller decisions is good, although I think anyone at the DAO should be able to move quickly for “smaller decisions” – we should have multiple teams on each workstream and they can have an initial vote for captial from the DAO, or to gather resources / recognition from the DAO, and then they can move on their own.

Maybe we should make criteria for what decisions must be put up for vote.

  • IMO anything that requires treasury
  • Any decision that has legal ramifications
  • Anything that requires official partnership / recognition by our DAO

That is pretty vague and probably requires more thought though. I think we need criteria for what should go through votes for sure though.

The way I think about it is I think every decision will need to go through approval of both:

  • The members (the “senate” or however we call it)
  • The tokens (the “congress”)
  • Then executed by the multisig (That reserves veto power in very specific circumstances)

Committees can be put together and destroyed for specific workstreams – I think this would be good, to basically trust their reasoning in a smaller circle. But I don’t think we should have one central committee to make decisions. IMO.

Some decisions like changing the multi-sig or other “special roles” could use the “most majority” vote v.s. the simple majority.